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Foreign Contacts and the First Amendment
I am editing a paper concerning the relationship between territory and the First Amendment, which I hope to
post to SSRN nex t month. The paper will ex amine a v ariety of restrictions on cross-border information
ex change, including laws that limit contacts between domestic speakers and foreign audiences and
organizations. It will also ex amine efforts to "ex port" the First Amendment bey ond the nation's borders, as
something akin to a univ ersal norm.
Contacts between domestic speakers and foreign audiences, organizations, and would-be collaborators hav e
obv iously increased substantially owing to globalization and digitization. Many laws and regulations that
impose restrictions on cross-border information ex change, including trav el bans and trade laws, hav e been
liberalized or repealed ov er the past few decades. This is not to say that we hav e "open borders" insofar as
informational materials and foreign audiences are concerned. U.S. laws and regulations continue to impose
significant restrictions on cross-border trav el and information ex change, many of which would be
problematic from a First Amendment standpoint but for the fact that they are imposed at the nation's
borders. Cross-border information flow is affected by strict licensing requirements, subject matter rev iew of
certain materials, trade embargoes, and limits on the ex port (and import) of materials, data, and information
that may implicate national security concerns.
Contacts between domestic speakers and foreign contacts can raise serious diplomatic and security
concerns. Alien scholars and other foreign speakers hav e no First Amendment or other constitutional right
to enter the country for any purpose, including what would otherwise be lawful speech and association
activ ities. The gov ernment's power to determine who may enter U.S. territory is subject to few, if any , limits.
Contacts between domestic speakers and foreign organizations that are believ ed to be inv olv ed in terrorist
activ ity hav e come under increasing scrutiny . The State Department has the power to designate
certain organizations "foreign terrorist organizations" (FTO). Charities and other organizations hav e
challenged these laws, with relativ ely little success, on v agueness, ov erbreadth, and First Amendment
grounds. In a case now pending before the Supreme Court (Holder v . Humanitarian Law Project), sev eral
domestic organizations that wish to collaborate with foreign organizations designated as FTOs are challenging
federal laws that prohibit the prov ision of "training," "ex pert adv ice or assistance," "serv ice," and "personnel"
to foreign terrorist organizations. In their opening brief, the organizations argue that these criminal
prov isions suppress "pure political speech," including the "prov ision of training in the use of humanitarian and
international law for the peaceful resolution of disputes." At the v ery least, the organizations argue that the
Court should limit the statutory prohibitions to “"spech intended to further a group's illegal ends."
The proposed limiting construction would likely av oid the most serious First Amendment questions posed by
the statutory prohibitions on material assistance. This route may well be appealing to a majority . But let's
assume the Court reaches the First Amendent questions. Does the First Amendment apply with equal force to
communications and associations inv olv ing foreign organizations, particularly those designated as FTOs?
Some thoughts on this issue after the break.
The brief, which is v ery well written and argued, assumes that the First Amendment applies with full force to
the communications and associations in question. In a paragraph on pp. 46-47 , the organizations argue that
the mere fact that the speech in question "implicates foreign affairs" does not take it outside the First
Amendment. Fair enough. The organizations further assert that "self-gov ernment includes foreign as well as
domestic affairs." No argument there either. Certainly , domestic speakers' comments regarding foreign
affairs are protected speech. Finally , the organizations' brief states that "[i]nternational communications are a
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central aspect of the robust public debate that the First Amendment is designed to protect." Putting aside that
some of the communications at issue may actually take place in domestic v enues and be directed to domestic
audiences, is it so clear that "international communications" and cross-border associations lie at or near the
core of the First Amendment?
Courts and commentators hav e dev oted little attention to this important question. Most of the theoretical
work relating to the First Amendment seems to assume a domestic contex t inv olv ing speakers and audiences
located within U.S. territorial borders. (Some theorists might simply assume that ev en speech directed
primarily to a foreign audience will almost alway s reach at least some domestic audience as well.) Does the
search for truth ex tend to international contacts and cross-border speech? Does selfgov ernment necessarily depend upon such things? If so, how can we justify allowing the gov ernment to limit
alien speakers' entry -- perhaps ev en on purely ideological grounds? Might self-actualization alone support
international contacts and ex changes? Or do we need a different justification or theory , one that accounts for
globalization and digitization, for cross-border contacts and ex changes?
There is relativ ely little legal, historical, or precedential support for robust protection of cross-border
contacts. The Supreme Court has only grudgingly assumed that the First Amendment is implicated by some
restrictions on foreign trav el. Trade laws continue to restrict a v ariety of collaborativ e arrangements
inv olv ing foreign authors, artists, and scientists. Citizens and resident aliens hav e no First Amendment right
to represent foreign missions in the U.S. In more general terms, the legal and regulatory infrastructure
relating to cross-border information flow, which I alluded to at the beginning of this post, suggests that the
First Amendment applies with less force to cross-border contacts and speech than it does to domestic speech
activ ities. This is especially true where national security concerns are raised, as is obv iously the case where
FTOs are concerned.
In sum, the supposition seems to be that "international" contacts and communications lie closer to
the periphery of the First Amendment than to its core. We need to think much more carefully about how and
why the First Amendment applies to cross-border contacts and ex pression. That issue will only become more
important as new cross-border channels of communication are opened.
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